There is a traditional distinction made in the analysis of interpersonal influence and conformity which has to do with uniformities in belief and behavior due to informational processes versus those due to normative processes (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) . The former involves the dissemination of knowledge among group members regarding an issue over which they differ. Faced with a collective choice, members inform each other about the merits of their respective position. Information which initially was only partially shared thereby becomes available to all. Consensus is achieved when the shared knowledge is persuasive, when it is sufficic~nt to demonstrate the superiority of one particular course of action. In COIItrast, normative processes describe the impact of rewards and pultiishments, actual or anticipated, When a person values his membership in a group and finds his position on an important issue differs from that of other mcmbcrs, he is likely to expericncc a variety of distressful ~~nlo-tions-fear of disapproval, of being shamctd, of loss in self-esteem. tbtc. The person will then ostensibly abandon his position and shift ton-art1 the consensus in order to reduce such threats.
While the distinction between informational and normative proccssc~s is not new, its relevance to collective decisions involving "risk" is onl! now becoming evident. This is the consequence of somewhat ovcrd~lc~ attempts to explain such exotic group induced shifts in choice as thr "risky" shift in terms of more general interpersonal processes.': The present research represents such an effort and considers the informational-normative distinction as basic in understanding these effrcts. A few reviews have recently appeared on group induced shifts ndricl~ raised several important and heretofore neglected points (Cartwright, 1971; Pruitt, 1971a; Vinokur, 1971a) . One is especially significant for 0111 purposes.
Both Pruitt and Vinokur sugqcst that the various thcoricls proposed to account for shifts fall into two distinct classes correspondinq, we think, to the normative-informational distinction.
More precisc,ly, therct is a group of theories which asserts that discussion is unnccessar~ and insufficient to produce shifts in choice. A member merely nliist recognize that his own position differs (in a spccifiecl direction) from others, such realization being sufficient to induce a shift. These theoric>s thus depend on interpersonal comparisons, althou,~h only one is cast in terms of classical social comparison theory (see below). A swond group of theories assumes exposure to or participation in discttssion is both nchccssary and sufficient. They stress persuasive argumentation and, to some extent, differential influence or leadership based ou such argumcrltntion. A brief description will clemonstratc that these classes of thcoric~s make quite different predictions which are readily tc~stable. (Doise, 1969; Gouge & Fraser, 1972 : Slo5rovici & %a\-illlimi, 1969 Myers & Bishop, 1970 , 1971 . For convenience sake, hoLyever. the quotation marks will be omitted in the remaining text.
The importance of persuasive argumentation in group decision making was noted some time ago by Thorndike (1938a,b) . It has been variously used to analyze group induced shifts in choice by Nordhey (1962 ), St. Jean ( 1970 ) Stoner ( 1968)) Teger and Pruitt ( 1967) ) Vinokur ( 1971a,b) , and Vinokur and Burnstein (1972) . The Vinokur version assumes that a particular decision elicits a set of standard arguments in support of the various alternatives among which the person must choose. Presumably the arguments reflect certain cultural vaIues engaged by the decision. A persuasive argument is thought to be similar in effect to that of a correct solution in group problem solving: once made, it is very likely to be accepted either because it is intrinsically cogent, the member who proposes the argument is highly confident of its merits, or both. These phenomena have been observed and discussed in a variety of group decision and group problem solving situations (Burnstein & Katz, 1971; Clausen, 1965; Thomas & Fink, 1961; Thorndike, 1938a,b; Vinokur, 1971a) . The number of arguments available to the average member (or the probability of a particular argument) will vary as a function of the issues raised by the decision. Thus, faced with a particular choice, a very large, a moderate, or an extremeIy small number of arguments may come to mind. The extent of the shift in choice a group will induce depends on the likelihood that the average member will have available all or most of the persuasive arguments. If the likelihood is very great, then individuals will have already made their initial choice on the basis of all or most of the persuasive arguments. Therefore, not only will they have confidently taken a relatively extreme position beforehand, but they also are unlikely to encounter new persuasive ideas in discussion, ones which had not been considered in making their initial choice. If the likelihood is very small, very few individuals will be able to muster strong support for their position during discussion, and thus hardly anyone will have a good reason for changing their choice. It follows that the largest shifts will be induced by group discussion when persuasive arguments have a moderate likelihood of being available to the average member.4
Among the interpersonal comparison theories, Brown (1965) , Levinger and Schneider ( 1969), and Jellison and Riskind ( 1970) assume that an individual contrasts his choice with the average choice of other members; and they predict, for somewhat different reasons, that relatively moderate choices will be changed so as to be equal to or more extreme than this average. Pruitt (1971a) believes the comparison is made with the most extreme member, to the same effect. The incentive for shifting also varies somewhat from theory to theory. For Brown, the member's * This analysis owes much to Steiner's work ( 1966) (Clark & Willems, 1969; Tegcr & Pruitt, 196i) , while nrost have folmtl no shifts at all (Clark et al., 1971; St. J can, 1970; Wnllncl1 l% Kog; ut, 1965) . Hence, although there has beon a good amount of work on dircussion versus knowledge of other's choiccl, the matter is still ~mxsolvc~tl. The present study takes a different approach to this problem. 111 the first of two experiments a subject knows that on some decisions IW ntust argue for his own position (ambiguous-for condition) ~(1 on others 1~8 must argue for the opposite (ambiguous-ajiainst conclitiolt ). Fle is :~IIXIX' that this is true for the other members as \vell. I-Io\vc\,clr. on a11y gi\,c*tk decision he does not know who is permitted to argllc-for thclir O\\.II choice and who is obliged to support some other position. Thus. ;I snl~-ject's own position cannot be inferred from \vhat 11~ sn!'s. Th(a sc~~mtl experiment consists of only one condition (~~~~aml~iguo~ls-nfini~~st) ; i t,k control woulcl merely replicate the standard paradigm for shift in c~hoicc~.
In this experiment any subject can prccisc~ly tlctc'rminc~ anoth(*r's rc~l prcfercnce because it is always the csact corltrar!, of what 11~1 xl\wc;Itc~s during group discussion.
The theories based on interpersonal comparison predict no shift ill choice as long as members remain ignorant of each other's rrwl prcfcrence; typical shifts will occur, however, when such knowledge bccomcts avnilublc, independent of discussion. ln thr first esperimc>nt thci pcrsolh n(~v(~r knows who is arguing for or who is ar,quill,g against their nctwl prtrfcrtancr,. ThlIs according to intcrprrsonal cr)tllp;u%oll th(aories. th(-rcs should 1~ no group induced shift in choices.
In the scum1 ~~qwrirnmt.
because a member's real preference can be readily determined (even though it is contrary to the position he advocates in discussion), the typical shifts toward risk and toward caution should be observed. Persuasive-argument theory leads one to expect almost the opposite results. Note that this theory assumes the individual will initially choose the alternative for which he has the greatest number of persuasive arguments. Hence, when asked to support a position which he had previously rejected (in the ambiguous-against and unambiguous-against conditions), the person is being required to advocate what for him is relatively unadvocable, that is, to take a position for which he has few persuasive arguments. It follows that persuasive argumentation is less likely to occur in these circumstances than under conditions in which the individual is free to advocate his initial choice (ambiguous-for). According to persuasive-argument theory, this means that little or no shift should be expected in either the ambiguous-against or the unambiguousagainst situation; typical shifts, however, will occur when individuals argue for their initial choice (ambiguous-for) even when they cannot infer another's real preference, that is, they do not know whether he is advocating his own position or one quite different.
Finally, keep in mind that obliging the subjects to argue against their own position allows the possibility of certain celebrated counter-attitudinal phenomena. These have little to do with the theories under consideration; in fact, they are beyond the scope of either. Changes in choice resulting from counterattitudinal processes, e.g., dissonance reduction, would, in fact, create atypical shifts in choice, opposite in direction from those normally obtained with these decisions. Shifts of this nature are predicted neither by interpersonal comparison nor by persuasive argumentation.
They therefore have little bearing on the issue at hand. 
Results
There is no evidence that subjects could reliably infer another's initial choice from the position he advocated during discussion.
In instances where every member argued for his initial choice (ambiguous-for condition) only 23% indicated they felt this to be the case; 3% indicated that they felt everyone was arguing against his initial choice; 59% indicated they felt that some argued for and others argued against their initial choices, and 15% indicated they could not tell. In instances where every member argued against his initial choice (ambiguous-against condition) only 15% indicated they felt this to be the case; 19% indicated they felt everyone was advocating his initial choice and 63% and 12% indicated they felt some argued for and others argued against their initial choice or they could not tell. Given four response categories, 23% of correct responses (i.e., responses indicating correct identification of the experimental situation) in ambiguous-for condition and 15% of correct responses in the ambiguous-against condition are well below chance. Moreover, internal analysis of the shifts produced by the subjects who correctly inferred the relationship between initial and advocated choice showed that they were not different from the shifts produced by the other subjects. In all cases the shifts of the correct subjects were in the same direction as the shifts of the other subjects, and in no case was the difference statistically significant. Indeed, in most cases, contrary to what would be predicted by interpersonal comparison theories, the shifts of the correct subjects were smaller in magnitude than the shifts of the other subjects.
The major results for shifts in choice are presented in shift which approaches but does not quite reach traditional levels of statistical significance. There is no sign of such shifts in the ambiguousagainst condition. A comparison between the overall shift on risky items (A + R) under the two experimental conditions reveals that the magnitude of the shift is reliably greater in ambiguous-for than in ambiguousagainst (t = 2.768, Pt < .Ol); a comparison between the overall shifts on cautious items (E + F) gives a similar difference but at a less robust level of statistical significance (t = 1.775, P, < .lO). LJnexpectedly, shifts were obtained on the neutral item, toward caution under ambiguous-for and toward risk under ambiguous-against conditions. Neither persuasive-arguments nor interpersonal comparison would pre-diet these effects. They are curious findings and defy straightforward explanation.
However, since they weigh neither for nor against the theories in question, we will merely note their occurrence and not venture to speculate as to their cause.
On the whole, it is clear that the first experiment gives reasonably strong support to persuasive-argument theory and no support at all to interpersonal comparison. Procedure. The procedure was identical to that of the previous experiment up to the administration of the first set of instructions. At this point the experimenter told the subjects that each time they would all be arguing for a position which was contrary to the one they had chosen initially. Several examples were given of "contrary positions," e.g., if 2 in 10 was initially chosen, then the subject would have to argue for 8 in 10, if 4 in 10 then 6 in 10, etc., so that the mirror-image principle was clear and they could readily determine another's initial choice from the position he supports in discussion.
As in the first experiment, subjects were asked to be explicit about the position they argued for at the outset and to argue as effectively as possible.
The remaining procedures were again identical to those of the first experiment.
The findings from this experiment are presented in Table 2 . Again the curious shift on the neutral item which, again, we will merely note. Neither risky item alone demonstrates a reliable shift; for both items combined there is some evidence of a shift, albeit quite weak. In absolute magnitude it is less than half the size of the shift obtained in the first experiment with the identical items under ambiguous-for conditions. Statistical analysis also indicates that it is reliably less (t = 1.968, Pt < .07). While there is stronger evidence for shifts on the cautious items, they all are in the tc;ron, u direction. That is to say, these mildly reliable changes in choice suggest the atypical shifts which were mentioned earlier as often associated with counterattitudinal behavior and as such are not considered to be group induced. Consistent with persuasive-argument theory, the typical shift for both cautious items combined under ambiguous-for conditions is considerably greater than that under unambiguous-against conditions (t = 4.601, Pt < .OOl). Once again, there is virtually no support for theories of interpersonal comparison. 
Discussion
Theories of interpersonal comparison attribute shifts in individual choice to normative processes-the anticipation of disapproval and loss of pride or self-esteem were one to maintain his discrepant positionwhich comes into play once the discrepancy is known. Because knowledge of other's position is the essential element, it must then be that if a member does not know where his colleagues stand, changes in initial choice cannot be induced, and if he does know, such changes can and will occur. The results of both experiments give no support to this point of view. Group induced shifts were obtained when little or no information was available as to the real position of other members (ambiguousfor), that is, under conditions in which not only were members prohibited from announcing their initial choice but also, they were aware that the latter could well be quite different from what they were obliged to advocate in discussion. Moreover, where it was clear that the choice a member announced and defended in discussion was mirror-image of his real position, which thus could be calculated, typical shifts in choice were not induced (unambiguous-against).
These findings are, however, fully consistent with the point of view that this widely studied group decision situation is governed by informational processes as specified by persuasive-argument theory, according to which knowledge of other's choice has little significance and the shifts typically obtained are the result of persuasive argumentation during discussion. Vinokur (1971a,b) h as conjectured that a specific decision will engage a set of standard arguments that vary in their persuasivesness and in their availability to the average number. A member's initial choice is determined by the number and the persuasiveness of arguments which come to mind as he weighs the decision, Thus, the extent to which a member commits himself to a particular alternative reflects the easy availability of many persuasive arguments in favor of the alternative. At the same time, of course, it is an indication that persuasive arguments in favor of the nonchosen alternative are difficult to come by. Thus, when (a) the decision elicits persuasive arguments which predominantly favor a particular alternative, (b) there is a moderate probability of such arguments being available to the average member, and (c) members are free to argue for their own choice, as is ordinarily the case, shifts in choice will occur following group discussion. The first two conditions above need not concern us here. In part, their rationale was suggested earlier and a detailed presentation appears elsewhere (Vinokur, 1971a,b) . The significance of the final condition is perhaps rather obvious. Because initial choice indicates the position for which a member has a relatively large number of persuasive arguments available, to require that he argue for the contrary position insures rather impoverished, that is, unpersuasive, argumentation. Therefore, in terms of our two experiments, persuasive-argument theory would lead one to expect typical shifts in choice following discussion regardless of whether the positions of others are known, if the person is permitted to advocate his initial choice. Typical shifts are unlikely to occur, however, when the person is constrained to argue for a position other than his own.
These expectations are reasonably well confirmed, although in general the shifts are smaller than those found in other studies, e.g., on the average they are slightly more than half the size of those obtained by Vinokur (1971b) . This might suggest two or more processes at work (Pruitt, 1971b) , that ordinarily both interpersonal comparison and persuasive argumentation operate to produce the typical shifts toward risk or caution. By excluding one of these components, naturally, we obtain a weaker effect. The two-process explanation would also lead us to expect relatively small but reliable risky and cautious shifts in the second experiment where persuasive argumentation was minimized but interpersonal comparison was distinctly possible. In general, such shifts were not observed. There is, however, another possible explanation of why attenuated shifts would be likely to occur in the present study. This explanation seems quite plausible and, moreover, assumes only one process at work, persuasive argumentation.
Briefly, if a member believes others are arguing for a position which they do not really hold, he treats their arguments with heightened skepticism.
In other words, our experimental treatment probably reduces somewhat the credibility ( and thus the persuasiveness ) of the argumentation.
I&~!ause the arguments lose their usual force, the shifts in choice xc ncccssarily attenuated. It smns unneccsary, therefore, to invoke interpc~rsonal comparison pro-WSSC'S (or the lack of such) to account tor th(: attclnuation of the shift.
Fillally, let us briefly attempt to clarify those curious shifts on cautious itc,lns in the second cqerimcnt.
It is \vc,ll-known that getting :L person to atl\Wxtc a position contrary to what lie bc~licvc3 (ix., to engage in countc,rattitudinal behavior) may Icad him at least partly, to accept the position he advocates (for example, SW Cxlsmith, Collins, & Helmreich, 1966; ; ZlcGuircl, 1969) . 111 the presclnt stlld!, c&cts of tllis type ~~~ltl :q>p~~ as at!/pical shifts. The Jason for this is simpl(~. It has IWCW c~st;lblishcd that CDQ-like itenrs which g:i\rc shifts toward a partic~ulal cWx~liic~, sav toward risk, also elicit initial choices ~~+ich in gcnc~l tc'nd to fall toxvard that end of the scale. to 1x1 sonIcwhat risky, for example. 'l'lirrs, members initially find odds of slightly less thaII five ollt of tc%rJ ;LS nccc~ptnblc on items which subscqucntly produc~c~ n shift toward risk ;u~d ocltls of IIZOW than fi\xr out of tcln on itelns \vhich slll)scq~~~~ntly produc(s a shift toward caution (WC Cartwright. rcdnctioil or soni(~ co~npamblc procc~ss, it' thc>y acccptecl the nqunc~nts the\. UY'W inclucc~tl I-O make. thou a cautious shift ~voultl appear on t!rpically rixky items ~1~1 a risk\ shift, on typically cautious items.
1liliil~~ incmbers argued against their on71 choice\ in both eqx7imcnts. slich atvpicnl shifts occurred, howcv(~r, onlv in the sccontl. This is not totnll!; incsplicablr. In their sc~1rcli for f/jr, conditions which ;tr(t most likely to product chan<cs in attitude following countcrattitnclinal lxha\~ior Carlsmith, Collins, and Helmreich ( 1966) indicate that the likelihootl is fireatcr \vhciI thcrc is pilblic kilOwlccl~,rc of the conntc,rattitutlillal act. Such public knowledge \vas n salient featnrt> of tllcl iiiialiil)i,~llolis-nqaiiist conclitinn. Vnder ambiguous-ajiainst or ambigiioiis-for conditions. it \V;LS not possible for any mcmb~r to know whcth~~r another uxs advocntiilq his real position or its contrary." " The atypical shifts do not appear as readily explained l,!, incrntivcy or wlfpcr.\llasion theory as by dissonance theory. The former \wnld swm to demand that shifts occur in both experiments, whenever memlwrs engage in coIlntrrnttitlldit-lal behavior. LfcGuire ( 1969 ) makes an excellent cwmparison of these t\vo theories ant1 points out a large number of loopholes whereby finding of this kind may 1~ safcl! reinterpreted within either context. Still, why is there no sign of an atypical shift for risky items in the second experiment? A dissonance reduction explanation would require a shift toward caution in this case. An examination of the average initial choices (see p1 in Table 2 ), however, suggests how counter-attitudinal effects might well have been more marked for cautious than for risky items, to wit: in terms of their distance from the scale midpoint (five chances out of ten), initial choice ( pl) on the former is more extreme than on the latter. According to our procedure for assigning a contrary position, the scale was pivoted about the midpoint with an initial choice of four out of ten being assigned six out of ten (and vice versa), three out of ten being assigned seven out of ten (and vice versa), etc. Thus, for cautious items, on the average, the position to be argued was quite contrary to the initial position, a difference of about six scale points between initial and argued choice-from eight out of ten to two out of ten for item E as well as item F. Not so with the risky items. A difference between initial and argued choice of about two scale points obtained, from four out of ten to six out of ten for item A, and virtually no difference existed for item B. The implication is clear. Greater dissonance could well have been produced on cautious than on risky items because the advocated positions were more incompatible with initial choice in the former than in the latter case. It follows that greater dissonance reduction and, thereby, a relatively marked atypical shift should have occurred on cautious items. 
